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Anomaly basedAbstract Bots are malicious software entities that unobtrusively infect machines and silently
engage in activities ranging from data stealing to cyber warfare. Most recent bot detection methods
rely on regularity of bot command and control (C&C) traffic for bot detection but state-of-the-art
bots randomize traffic properties to evade regularity based detection techniques. We propose a bot
detection system that aims to detect randomized bot C&C traffic and also aim at early bot detec-
tion. To this end, separate strategies are devised for bot detection: (i) over a user session and (ii)
time periods larger than a user session. Normal HTTP traffic and bot control traffic are modeled
over a user session and a Multi-Layer Perceptron Classifier is trained on the two models and later
used to classify unlabeled destinations as benign or malicious. For traffic spanning time intervals
larger than a user session, temporal persistence, is used to differentiate between traffic to benign
and malicious destinations. Testing with multiple datasets yielded good results.
 2016 Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
A botnet is a network of compromised machines controlled by
a botmaster through a command and control (C&C) channel
[1]. Botnets are highly malevolent entities used by cyber crim-
inals in launching various attacks ranging from data stealing,
spamming, phishing and DoS attacks to cyber warfare against
nations and detecting and mitigating their effects demand crit-
ical attention.
The major focus of research in botnet detection falls under
the broad category of anomaly based intrusion detectionsystems [2] which can further be classified into host-based
and network based. Host-based bot detection systems [3–7]
are located on the host itself and inspect evidence collected
from that host such as system calls executed and their
sequence, files and registry entries modified, processes that
are active, user input and interaction and malware signatures,
to decide whether the machine is bot infected or not. But bots
have evolved over the years and employ several evasive tech-
niques to avoid detection including use of packers [8], poly-
morphism and other code obfuscation methods [9] and
rootkit techniques [10,11]. A bot with rootkit component is
used to hide its presence on the host by suppressing all evi-
dence exhibited by it and thus evade host-based detection.
Network-based botnet detection systems [1,12–17] are located
at the network edge and look at packet traffic arriving at the
network edge to identify possible bot generated communica-
tion patterns. Bot C&C is the weakest link in a botnet and sev-
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larity of communication patterns of bot C&C channel for
bot detection. Newer bots such as Stuxnet randomize the com-
munication pattern between bots and their masters thereby
evading regularity based detection techniques and to our
knowledge detection of randomized bot C&C traffic has not
been addressed earlier. Another requirement for botnet detec-
tion that has largely been unaddressed by existing detection
strategies is early detection of bots.
We propose a bot detection system which uses traffic anal-
ysis of an end-point host to identify bot command and control
(C&C) communications even when the communication pat-
terns are randomized to evade detection and also aims at early
detection of bots. Towards this end, the bot detection system
proposed is made up of two parts – a Multi Layer Perceptron
(MLP) Classifier designed to separate user generated HTTP
traffic and bot command and control traffic over a user session
and a Temporal Persistence (TP) Classifier that makes use of
temporal persistence, the property of bot control traffic to
repeatedly contact its bot master over time to detect bot
C&C traffic. The duration of a user session is found to be
around 15 min [21] and normal user-generated HTTP traffic
and bot control traffic are modeled over a user session and
used to train a Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) Classifier which
is later used to separate bot and benign traffic within the user
session, thereby enabling early detection. Bot and benign traf-
fic are separately modeled and used to train the MLP Classifier
and randomizing bot C&C traffic would move it away in fea-
ture space from the trained bot model but it would still be suf-
ficiently further away from the normal user-generated HTTP
traffic model to be classified as benign. Hence randomization
of traffic features does not affect the classification accuracy
of the MLP Classifier much as is seen in Section 4.5. Bot traffic
could span time intervals larger than a user session and such
traffic is taken care of by the TP Classifier. The TP Classifier
monitors temporal persistence of traffic over multiple time-
scales varying from 150 min, 10 h, 20 h and 40 h. Further,
the TP Classifier considers only the repeated nature of traffic
to a destination and does not consider the exact time of bot
communication or the exact time intervals between bot com-
munications and hence can detect traffic to bot servers even
when the traffic is randomized to evade detection.
The proposed bot detection system is trained and tested
using bot traffic generated using Zeus and BlackEnergy bots
run on DETER testbed [21] and normal HTTP traffic gener-
ated using a clean Windows XP machine. Testing is also done
with novel traffic – traffic on which the system has not been
trained – from Banbra, Bifrose, Dedler, Sasfis, Ramnit and
Pushdo bots [22] and the overall bot detection rate of 97.7%
and overall detection rate of bot destinations being 84.3%. It
may be mentioned that more than 50% of bot samples in the
novel dataset generated randomized traffic and the detection
rate of the system is good. To estimate the false alerts gener-
ated by the system, we used an attack free subset of DARPA
dataset [23] and a subset of LBNL dataset [37] and the False
Positive Rate of the system are 6% and 2.3% respectively. In
30% of the test cases, bot destinations were identified within
15 min of data generation which is important since early iden-
tification of bots helps defenders to devise strategies in protect-
ing against and mitigating further malicious behavior.2. Related work
Botnet detection is an active area of research and the publica-
tions in this area are broadly classified into host-based [3–7]
and network-based approaches [1,12–17]. Host-based systems,
as already mentioned in Section 1, analyze evidence collected
from hosts to detect bots. With bots incorporating rootkit
behavior, host-level evidence collected is not reliable.
Network-based botnet detection is a complementary approach
and monitors network traffic for botnet detection. Based on
the protocol used by bots, network-based botnet detection
approaches are classified into IRC-based [13,24], P2P-based
[25,26], SMTP-based [27,28], DNS-based [16,29] and so on.
Not much work exists in detection of HTTP-based bots
although generic botnet detection systems such as BotSniffer
[30], BotMiner [1] and TAMD [14] are effective detectors. They
look for similar communication patterns from multiple hosts
to identify bots and hence cannot identify a single bot-
infected host. BotHunter [31] models the bot-infection life
cycle and identifies the modeled behavior on a host. But bot-
infection life cycles evolve with time and detection methods
based on the model fail to detect more recent bots. Botzilla
[32] also identifies bot-infected hosts from network traffic,
but is signature-based. Signature-based systems are effective
in identifying known bots but fail to detect newer variants of
existing bots as well as new bots.
Giroire et al. [33] use temporal persistence, a measure of
repeatedly contacting a destination over time as the distin-
guishing characteristic to separate benign and malicious desti-
nations. Persistence is a good measure for detecting bots, but
the work in [33] is meant for hosts on an enterprise network
which are well behaved and the destinations contacted by it
are restricted to a limited set so that a static white-list would
suffice. Traffic analysis of a host is done by several works
[18–20] and utilizes regularity of bot communications to iden-
tify bot infection. Botfinder [19] and CoCoSpot [18] generate
models of bot C&C behavior by clustering similar bot C&C
channels and developing fingerprints for C&C channels.
AsSadhan et al. [20] use signal processing techniques to iden-
tify periodic traffic from the host. These bot detection methods
show a significant degradation in performance when bots use
randomization techniques to evade detection. In the following
section we present RCC Detector, a bot detection system that
proposes to overcome this limitation.
3. Randomized bot command and control channel detector (RCC
Detector)
RCC Detector, identifies bot command and control (C&C)
communications from an end-point host through traffic analy-
sis of the host. RCC Detector aims (i) at early detection of bots
and (ii) to detect bot control traffic even when it is randomized
to evade detection. With this aim in mind, RCC Detector is
designed to consist of two classifiers: (i) an MLP Classifier that
is trained to differentiate between normal user-generated
HTTP traffic and bot control traffic over a user session and
(ii) the TP Classifier that utilizes temporal persistence to iden-
tify bot control traffic for time periods larger than a user ses-
sion. As already mentioned in Section 1, a user session is
Figure 1 RCC Detector – architecture.
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traffic are modeled over a user session and the model is used
to train a Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) Classifier that is later
used to differentiate malicious and benign traffic within a user
session. This facilitates early detection of bot presence on the
host machine and mitigation strategies can be initiated before
bots launch the attacks in their repertoire and inconvenience or
harm the user or disrupt user activity. But bot traffic is not lim-
ited to a user session and might span over larger time intervals
so as to maintain a low profile and escape detectors. Neverthe-
less, the fact remains that bots need to repeatedly communicate
with the bot masters to successfully carry out commands or to
report status information. So, for time intervals larger than a
user session, this bot property of repeatedly communicating
with bot masters is exploited to identify bot traffic, temporal
persistence – a measure of how repeatedly a destination is con-
tacted over time – is estimated over large time intervals, and
traffic to destinations with persistence value above a threshold
is classified as malicious.
Temporal persistence is measured by the Temporal Persis-
tence (TP) Classifier as follows: Time is measured over a time
window,W, which is made up of multiple timeslots and tempo-
ral persistence of a destination is estimated by finding the frac-
tion of timeslots in W in which the destination is contacted by
the host. The minimum timeslot chosen is the user session itself
of 15 min duration and 1 h, 2 h and 4 h are preferred for the
larger timeslots. Larger timeslots entail the overhead of main-
taining and processing traffic information over a larger time
period. Moreover, detection is delayed with larger timeslots.
But larger timeslots offer the advantage of obtaining more
information about traffic for decision making. With the largest
timeslot of 4 h and a sufficiently large window size of 10, the
system would be able to monitor traffic for up to 40 h. Bigger
timeslots can be considered later after analyzing the overhead
and performance issues.
To capture repeated bot communication at diverse time
intervals, we estimate temporal persistence at multiple time-
scales being time windows with varying timeslot sizes – and
destinations exhibiting persistence above a threshold in any
of the timescales is classified as a bot. Temporal Persistence
only evaluates the repeated nature of a destination being con-
tacted and does not consider the time of access or the time
intervals at which the destinations are contacted. Hence, tem-
poral persistence is able to identify bot destinations even when
the traffic is randomized by the bot to evade detection.
Temporal persistence has been used earlier [33] for bot
detection on well-behaved hosts on an enterprise network
and the effectiveness of that method relied on the presence
of a stable white-list of destinations built over two weeks of
training. But RCC Detector is meant for any end-point device
that can directly connect to the Internet and whose traffic gen-
erated is not limited to a set of destinations. Hence a static
white-list would result in a large number of false alerts render-
ing the detector ineffective. So the MLP Classifier is suitably
configured and used to build a dynamic white-list of destina-
tions that is updated on-the-fly. The white-list is also used
for filtering out traffic to benign destinations thereby reducing
the workload on the detector and unlike in [33] populating the
white-list does not require a training period. The MLP Classi-
fier part of RCC Detector also enables early detection of bots
which affords the advantage to the defenders of devisingstrategies for protecting the host before the bots launch their
attack payload.
The overall architecture of RCC Detector is given in Fig. 1.
The input packets are first processed by the Data Preprocess-
ing module which filters out traffic to known benign destina-
tions based on the white-list, aggregates packets to the same
destination into flows, chronologically orders the flows and
extracts features that are used by the Classifiers. The details
of Data Preprocessing module are presented in Section 3.3.
The MLP Classifier analyzes features extracted from traffic
generated in a user session for bot detection and also builds
the dynamic white-list while the Temporal Persistence Classi-
fier evaluates the persistence of traffic to destinations over mul-
tiple timescales for bot detection. The two classifiers are
described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.
3.1. MLP Classifier
The MLP Classifier is a neural network classifier that is trained
to differentiate traffic to benign and malicious destinations
based on a set of features extracted from traffic for a user ses-
sion. The features used by the MLP Classifier are chosen based
on traffic characterization and empirical modeling of normal
user-generated HTTP and bot C&C traffic. The characteriza-
tion of HTTP traffic is done based on data collected from an
untainted Windows XP host used by 10 distinct users over
56 days. Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4 is used for data cap-
ture. Bot Traffic Characterization is done using data collected
from bots run on DETER Testbed [21]. A botnet is set up on
DETER testbed with a single C&C server and multiple bots
using binaries of two bot families, Zeus [35] and BlackEnergy
[36]. Data are collected for 18 days from the bot side of the net-
work. The traffic characterization dataset is labeled Dataset a
and used for cross-validation testing of the MLP Classifier in
Section 4.
The timeslot for characterization of traffic is also chosen to
be of 15 min duration. A sliding window is maintained over the
timeslots with the time window sliding 5 min at a time. A Flow
Set is defined over a timeslot which is the set of flows to a par-
ticular destination. A flow is a set of packets that share the
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Domain Name, Source Port, Destination Port and Protocol.
The set of features extracted from a Flow Set which are used
for modeling the traffic are discussed below.
Flow count: It is the number of flows in a Flow Set. Normal
HTTP traffic is bursty generating a large number of flows in a
short time while bots maintain a low profile, communicating
with the botmasters at larger time intervals to escape detection.
Fig. 2(a) shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
plots for Flow Count values of normal HTTP, bot and Web
traffic and it is seen that Flow Count values are less than 5
for 90% of bot traffic and it is greater than 5 for 95% of nor-
mal HTTP traffic considered. There is a clear difference in
Flow Count values for both classes of traffic; hence, Flow
Count is used as one of the features for distinguishing bot
and normal HTTP traffic. Retrieving frames on web pages
hosted by external content delivery providers like akamai.net
generate flows with low Flow Count values. Flow Count due
to these flows is included in the CDF plot labeled Web in
Fig. 2(a) and is presented here for completeness.
Session length: It is the duration of a session to a single des-
tination. Normal HTTP sessions are very short, generating
many flows to a destination in a few seconds, while bot ses-
sions are spread over a larger period and this distinctive behav-
ior is noticeable in the empirical CDF plot of Session Length
generated with Dataset a and shown in Fig. 2(b).Figure 2 Cumulative distribuUniformity score: Bot programs exhibit regularity in packet
count values for flows in a Flow Set while normal traffic shows
highly varied packet counts. We capture this difference in traf-
fic behavior using a feature called Uniformity Score. It is a
measure of the regularity in packet count values of flows in a
Flow Set and it is defined as follows.
The set of packet count values in a Flow Set
P ¼ fp1; p2; . . . ; png where each pi represents the packet count
in a single flow and n is the Flow Count.
UniformityScore ¼ n d
n 1 ð1Þ
where d is the number of distinct values of pi,
d ¼ n; when all pi are distinct
1; when all pi are same

Uniformity Score varies from 0 to 1. Regularity in packet
count will result in a Uniformity Score of 1. We plot the empir-
ical CDF for Uniformity Score value for user-generated HTTP
and bot C&C traffic in Fig. 2(c) and the contrast in behavior is
conspicuously visible.
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) distance D: Kolmogorov–Smir-
nov Test is a distribution-free test of goodness of fit. The test
calculates the maximum difference between an empirical distri-
bution and a known cumulative distribution. From a list of
data points Y ¼ fY1;Y2; . . . ;Yng, a value SNðxÞ, which istion functions of features.
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puted [34]. The KS distance D is defined as
D ¼ jSNðxÞ  PðxÞj
where PðxÞ is a known cumulative distribution function.
We use KS distance, D, to compute the distance between
Time Gap values of normal HTTP traffic and a random Time
Gap set TG. Time Gap is the time interval between consecutive
flows in a Flow Set. Normal HTTP traffic is bursty and a large
number of flows are generated at very close time intervals. In
the case of bots, flows are generated at large intervals and they
vary depending on the time interval configured in the bot client
software.
To compute KS Distance, D, we assume PðxÞ to be the
empirical distribution for normal HTTP traffic, which we draw
from the data used for traffic characterization. D is the dis-
tance between PðxÞ and any arbitrary Time Gap set
TG ¼ ft1; t2; . . . ; tng, where each ti represents time interval
between consecutive flows in the Flow Set. The CDF plots
of KS Distance D values of bot and benign traffic are plotted
and shown in Fig. 2(d) and marked difference in D values is
observed between the two traffic categories.
The four features defined above are extracted from traffic
and passed on to the MLP Classifier for detection.
3.1.1. Classifier
The MLP classifier used is a feed forward neural network
which uses Back Propagation Algorithm for learning. Neural
Networks have been widely used in pattern recognition, classi-
fication, clustering and such other cognitive tasks since they
have a high tolerance of noisy data and can be used when
we have little knowledge of the relationships between attri-
butes and classes. For our system, we know the behavior of
normal HTTP traffic as well as that of currently prevalent
bots. But bot behavior could vary in the future. In such a sce-
nario, a neural network would be a better classifier than a
deterministic or probabilistic classifier. We design our MLP
Classifier to have an input layer, an output layer and one hid-
den layer with four neurons. The feature vectors of a set of
normal and bot traffic are extracted and used to train the
MLP Classifier. This trained MLP Classifier is later used to
classify unlabeled destinations as benign or malicious. When
the number of flows in a Flow Set is less than three, feature
extraction cannot be done and hence such traffic instances can-
not be classified by the MLP Classifier. Such flows are aggre-
gated over larger time intervals and taken care of by the
Temporal Persistence Classifier described in Section 3.2.
3.2. Temporal Persistence Classifier
The MLP Classifier described in the previous section handles
traffic generated for a single user session at a time. But bot
communications could take place at diverse times and large
time intervals and a detector should be robust enough to take
care of this diversity. Temporal Persistence Classifier tracks
traffic for multiple user sessions and estimates temporal persis-pð15;10Þ¼ f0:2;0:1;0:1;0:1;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:1;0:1;0tence, a measure of how repeatedly a host contacts the destina-
tion over time and is estimated as follows. Time is considered
to be made up of timeslots, say, 15 min, and multiple timeslots
make up a time window,W. Temporal persistence is estimated
by recording the timeslots in which a destination is contacted
by the host and then finding the fraction of timeslots in the
time window in which connections to the destination are pre-
sent. Temporal Persistence of a destination d, calculated over
time window W consisting of n timeslots is as follows:
pðd;WÞ ¼ 1
n
Xn
i¼1
1d;si ð2Þ
where si is the ith timeslot and 1d;si has a value 1 if the host
makes at least one connection to d in the time-slot si, and 0
otherwise.
For every destination contacted by the host, a bitmap is
maintained to record the timeslots in which the destination is
contacted. When the host communicates with a destination
in a timeslot, the corresponding bit is set to 1. Fig. 3 depicts
network flows to destination d as a time sequence and also
shows how the presence of flows is represented using a bitmap.
In 3(a), network flows to destination d are depicted as a time
sequence over 15-min timeslots in a 10 h time period. Fig. 3
(b) is a bitmap sequence to represent the network flow
sequence and a bit in the bitmap is set to 1 if there is a flow
to destination d in a timeslot and is set to 0 otherwise. We
choose to have 10 timeslots in a time window W as is done
in [33] and temporal persistence to destination d is estimated
from the bitmap sequence using Eq. (2) with n= 10. Using
Eq. (2) on bitmap sequence in Fig. 3(b), temporal persistence
for time window with timeslots 1–10 is arrived as 0.7. Fig. 3
(c) shows the bitmap for destination d with timeslot size at
60 min and persistence is computed to be 0.9 for the time win-
dow with timeslots 1–10.
Since bot communications are at varied time intervals, per-
sistent behavior of bots needs to be evaluated using temporal
persistent metric at multiple timescales. A timescale is repre-
sented as a tuple ðt;WÞ with t the size of the timeslot and W
the window size. For example, (15,10) represents a timescale
with timeslots of size 15 min and 10 timeslots in a time win-
dow. t and W are assigned different values to realize multiple
timescales. The timeslots chosen, as already mentioned in Sec-
tion 3, are 15 min, 60 min, 120 min and 240 min and the win-
dow size n is fixed at 10. Hence the timescales we choose are
(15,10), (60,10), (120,10), and (240,10). The TP Classifier
computes temporal persistence at specific points in time for
all timescales and if temporal persistence value in any of the
timescales is above 0.6, the destination is marked a bot. The
threshold of 0.6 is chosen based on the study in [33]. Fig. 4
illustrates how persistent destinations can be identified using
the TP Classifier at any one of the timescales. As already men-
tioned, the timescales we choose are (15,10), (60,10), (120,10),
(240,10). Fig. 4(a) shows network flows at infrequent intervals
to a destination d and the temporal persistence values com-
puted for 30 time windows of timescale (15,10) are::2;0:2;0:1;0:1;0:1;0:1;0:1;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:3;0:3;0:2;0:2;0:2;0:2g
Figure 3 Temporal persistence of network flows.
Figure 4 Persistent behavior at larger intervals captured at higher timescales.
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from the bitmask sequence in Fig. 4(c) as
pð60; 10Þ ¼ f0:6g
We see that all temporal persistence values in pð15; 10Þ are
below the threshold of 0.6 and the persistent behavior of traffic
in Fig. 4(a) is captured in timescale ð60; 10Þ with pð60; 10Þ hav-
ing a value of 0.6. So persistent behavior of network flows at
infrequent intervals is captured at higher timescales and we
conclude that temporal persistence can be used to detect persis-
tent bot destinations even when they delay time between com-
munications to remain below the detection radar.
A phenomenon noticed among recent bots such as Stuxnet
is that they randomize the C&C channels by varying the time
between consecutive communication and the number of bytes
sent through the channel. State-of-the-art bot detection meth-
ods, which mostly rely on regularity of bot C&C for detection,
fail to identify this type of bot traffic. We argue that since tem-poral persistence is evaluated by the TP Classifier over multiple
timescales and since computing temporal persistence requires
recording only whether communication to a destination has
taken place in a timeslot or not and does not need to consider
the exact time of communication or the time intervals between
communication, varying time between bot communications
through randomization will result in persistence in any one
of the timescales to be above the threshold and therefore ran-
domized bot C&C will also be detected.
Fig. 5 illustrates how temporal persistence is not affected by
randomization of time gap between flows. In Fig. 5(a), net-
work flows at random time intervals with average time
between flows at 21 min are shown while Fig. 5(b) shows net-
work flows at regular time intervals of 23 min. Temporal per-
sistence for both network flow sequences is computed for the
timescale ð15; 10Þ and plotted in Fig. 5(c). The x-axis in
Fig. 5(c) represents consecutive time windows in the network
flow sequence and y-axis represents the corresponding tempo-
Figure 5 Comparison of temporal persistence for regular and randomized network flows.
Figure 6 Threshold vs false negatives/true negatives.
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sistence values for randomized and regular network flows are
0.7 and 0.6 respectively. A look at the persistence values for
the 32 time windows shows that the persistence values remain
in the range 0.5 to 0.7 for the two types of flows and we infer
that randomization of traffic does not affect the persistence
values. Hence TP Classifier can be used to detect randomized
bot traffic.
We have seen how bot and benign destinations are sepa-
rated using temporal persistence as the metric. However, we
need to keep in mind the fact that there are certain benign des-
tinations such as software update sites that also exhibit persis-
tent behavior and hence the effectiveness of bot C&C detection
using temporal persistence relies on the presence of a white-list
of benign destinations. The following section describes how the
MLP Classifier is used to dynamically build the white-list.
3.3. Dynamic white-list
An analysis of temporal persistence of network traffic showed
that 5% of benign destinations show persistent behavior and
these destinations need to be white-listed for effective working
of the Temporal Persistence Classifier. The white-list is built
dynamically by the MLP Classifier. The white-list starts with
a single destination, viz, www.google.com and more destina-
tions are added by the MLP Classifier when the output of
the Classifier generates a value less than 0.01. The output value
ranges from 0 for input features of benign destinations and 1corresponding to bot destinations. We choose a threshold
value of 0.01 for adding benign destinations to the white-list
by analyzing the effect of varying thresholds on False Nega-
tives (FN) and True Negatives(TN) added to the white-list as
is shown in Fig. 6. From the analysis, it is found that at a
threshold of 0.01 the FN added to the white-list is nil while
the TN added is reduced to 60% of total TNs. Since it is
important that no malicious destinations should be white-
listed, we decided on the threshold of 0.01. The implication
of low threshold on the TN is that the white-list is populated
with true negatives at a slower rate.
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Data Preprocessing is responsible for filtering input traffic,
aggregating packets into flows and feature extraction from
flows. The white-list of destinations is used to filter out traffic
to known benign destinations thereby eliminating the need for
such traffic to be examined by the classifiers and reducing the
number of packets processed by the system by an average fac-
tor of 76%. The filtered traffic is grouped into flows, chrono-
logically ordered to form a Flow Set and features mentioned
in Section 3.1 are extracted from the Flow Set to be used by
the MLP Classifier. When a Flow Set has less than 3 flows, fea-
ture extraction cannot be done and such flows are taken care of
by the Temporal Persistence Classifier. Python 2.7.2 is used in
implementing the Data Preprocessing and Classifier modules.
4. Evaluation and results
In this section we present how RCC Detector is evaluated
using multiple datasets to show the effectiveness of bot detec-
tion even with randomized traffic.
4.1. Dataset
The datasets used in testing RCC Detector are as follows:
1. Dataset a – This is the dataset used for traffic characteriza-
tion and modeling described in Section 3.1 and consists of
features corresponding to 10,461 destinations contacted.
2. Dataset b – Week1 of DARPA Dataset [23] that is attack
free. This dataset is used to test the ability of RCC Detector
in classifying novel benign traffic.
3. Dataset c – Bot traffic generated using the bots – Banbra,
Bifrose, Dedler, Ramnit, Sasfis and Pushdo is a novel mali-
cious dataset used to test both MLP and TPC Classifiers.
Multiple bot binaries of the above bot families obtained
from Open Malware [22] are executed to get a total of 43
traffic samples. The performance of MLP Classifier, TP
Classifier and the overall performance of RCC Detector
on these traffic samples is presented in Table 2.
4. Dataset d – This dataset involves packet data from Lawr-
ence Berkley National Laboratory’s (LBNL) internal enter-
prise network captured in October 2005 and available at
[37]. The traces we have used for evaluation are listed in
Table 1.Table 1 LBNL dataset – traces used.
Sl. no: Trace
1 lbl-internal.20041004-1303.port001.dump.anon
2 lbl-internal.20041004-1323.port005.dump.anon
3 lbl-internal.20041004-1333.port007.dump.anon
4 lbl-internal.20041004-1418.port011.dump.anon
5 lbl-internal.20041004-1438.port015.dump.anon
6 lbl-internal.20041004-1458.port019.dump.anon
7 lbl-internal.20041215-0008.port011.dump.anon
8 lbl-internal.20041215-0309.port003.dump.anon4.2. Evaluation metrics
The following metrics are used to evaluate the performance of
the system:
– Detection Rate or Sensitivity of the system is defined as the
percentage of positive instances that are correctly identified.
Positive instances refer to the feature vectors corresponding
to bot traffic.
Sensitivity ¼ TP
Positives
where TP is the set of True Positives identified by the sys-
tem and Positives is the set of Positive or bot data instances
actually present in the test data set.
– False Positive Rate is the percentage of benign data
instances incorrectly classified as malware.
False Positive Rate ðFPRÞ ¼ FP
FPþ TN4.3. Results and discussion
A 10-fold cross-validation testing of MLP Classifier using
Dataset a yields a detection rate of 99.8% and false positive
rate of 0.48%. We also test the MLP Classifier with Dataset
b to arrive at the FPR which is 6%. The Temporal Persistence
Classifier is tested with Datasets b and c. For Dataset b which
is the subset of DARPA dataset, none of the destinations
showed persistence above 0.1 effectively yielding a FPR of 0%.
The performance of both the Classifiers on Dataset c is pre-
sented in Table 1 and it is seen that the overall detection rate of
the system is 84.3% implying that 84.3% of all malicious des-
tinations contacted by the bots could be correctly identified. It
may be noted in Table 1 that only one bot sample, viz, sample
7 could not be detected yielding a bot detection rate of 97.7%.
Out of 43 bot samples, 28 of them have a detection rate of
100%, meaning all malicious destinations have been correctly
identified. The samples that show poor detection rates are sam-
ples 7, 28, 37 and 46. On closer examination of the traffic gen-
erated by samples 28, 37 and 46 showed that the destinations
which could not be detected generated only a single flow dur-
ing the duration of data capture and with a single flow neither
the MLP Classifier nor the TP Classifier can classify the desti-Sl. no: Trace
9 lbl-internal.20041004-1316.port004.dump.anon
10 lbl-internal.20041004-1326.port006.dump.anon
11 lbl-internal.20041004-1343.port009.dump.anon
12 lbl-internal.20041004-1428.port013.dump.anon
13 lbl-internal.20041004-1448.port017.dump.anon
14 lbl-internal.20041004-1509.port021.dump.anon
15 lbl-internal.20041215-0209.port001.dump.anon
Table 2 Performance of RCC Detector on novel bot families.
Bot sample
no:
Bot
family
Time period of data
collection (min)
MLP classifier
– DR
TP classifier –
DR
Overall
DR
Randomized/
regular
Timescale of detection
1 Banbra 41 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10)
2 Banbra 39 1 0 1 Randomized User session
3 Banbra 28 1 0 1 Randomized User session
4 Banbra 29 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10)
5 Bifrose 83 0 1 1 Regular (15,10)
6 Bifrose 71 1 0 1 Regular User session
7 Bifrose 60 0 0 0 Randomized User session
8 Dedler 300 0.8947 0 0.8947 Regular User session
9 Dedler 287 0 1 1 Regular (15,10)
10 Dedler 330 1 0 1 Regular User session
11 Dedler 300 1 0 1 Regular User session
12 Dedler 90 1 1 1 Regular User session (15,10)
13 Dedler 103 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10), (60,10)
14 Dedler 100 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10), (60,10)
15 Dedler 180 1 1 1 Randomized (15,10)
16 Ramnit 20 1 0 0.6 Regular User session
17 Ramnit 75 0.972 0.666 0.9111 Regular,
randomized
User session (15,10)
18 Ramnit 75 1 0 1 Regular User session
19 Sasfis 130 1 0 1 Randomized User session
20 Sasfis 128 0.875 0 0.875 Randomized User session
21 Banbra 50 0 0.5 0.5 Regular (15,10)
22 Banbra 180 1 0.409 0.6389 Regular User session (60,10)
23 Banbra 180 0.945 0.4 0.977 Randomized User session (60,10)
24 Banbra 502 0.375 0.464 0.5 Randomized User session (60,10),
(120,10)
25 Banbra 152 0.2 0.421 0.4583 Randomized User session
26 Banbra 39 1 0 1 Randomized User session
27 Banbra 40 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10)
28 Banbra 29 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10)
29 Dedler 21 0 1 1 Regular (15,10)
30 Dedler 164 0 1 1 Randomized (60,10)
31 Dedler 154 1 1 1 Randomized User session (15,10)
32 Dedler 180 0 1 1 Regular (15,10)
33 Dedler 520 0 0.2 0.2 Regular (15,10)
34 Dedler 90 1 1 1 Randomized User session (15,10)
35 Dedler 100 1 1 1 Randomized User session (15,10)
36 Dedler 90 0 0.5 0.5 Randomized (60,10)
37 Dedler 93 0 0.5 0.5 Randomized (15,10)
38 Dedler 100 0 0.5 0.5 Randomized (15,10)
39 Dedler 114 1 1 1 Regular User session (15,10)
40 Dedler 37 0 1 1 Randomized (15,10)
41 Pushdo 510 1 0 1 Regular User session (15,10)
42 Sasfis 180 0.8 0.049 0.197 Randomized User session (15,10)
43 Sasfis 300 1 0 1 Regular User session
Randomized bot command and control traffic 2779nation. The bot sample 7, belonging to Bifrose family, gener-
ated very large number of flows in a user session effectively
mimicking normal traffic behavior and was incorrectly classi-
fied as normal traffic. The behavior of bot sample 7 is found
to be unusual since bots generally generate lesser number of
flows in order to keep a low profile and to go below the radar
of detection systems.
It may also be noted that out of 43 bot samples used for
testing, 25 of them, more than half of the samples, generate
randomized bot traffic and overall detection rate of malicious
destinations generated by randomized samples alone is 82.4%.
Table 1 also shows the timescale in which a bot destination is
detected. In 13 of the cases presented, the bot destinations are
detected within 15 min of traffic generation and early detection
of bots gives time for the defenders to devise mitigation strate-gies to prevent the bot from activities that would further dam-
age the host and the interconnected network.
4.4. Comparison with other methods
Botfinder [19] is the only bot detection method which evaluates
the effect of randomization on detection rate. Botfinder is a
regularity based detection approach and randomization lowers
the detection rate from 77% without randomization to 60%
with 100% randomization. The detection rate of RCC Detec-
tor is 84% on testing with a mix of randomized and regular
datasets (Dataset c) and the results are shown in Table 1.
Other recent bot detection methods like CoCoSpot [18] and
AsSadhan [20] are also based on regular behavior of bots.
CoCospot has a detection rate of 95.6% for half of the bot
Figure 7 Effect of randomization on detection rate of MLP
classifier.
2780 B. Soniya, M. Wilscyfamilies tested while the detection rate is lower than 50% for
others. AsSadhan et al.’s work is also able to detect periodic
bot traffic but both methods do not evaluate the effect of ran-
domization techniques on the effectiveness of detection.
4.5. Effect of randomization on MLP Classifier
In Section 3.2, we saw how temporal persistence does not vary
with randomization of time between flows. In this section, we
evaluate how detection rate of the MLP Classifier varies with
randomization of traffic. Randomization would mean varying
the time interval between communications, the packets or
bytes sent or received by the bot or any other factor that per-
turbs the regularity of communication. We analyze the effect
of randomization of (i) time intervals between flows, (ii) packet
counts in flows, and (iii) combination of (i) and (ii), on the
detection rate of the MLP Classifier are the results are pre-
sented in Fig. 7.
The plot labeled Time gap in the figure shows that a signif-
icant variation in detection rate does not take place with ran-
domization of time intervals between flows. But with
randomization of packet counts in flows, the detection rate
drops to 76% as is shown by graph labeled Packet Count.
Randomizing packet count and time intervals together also
show a similar plot to Packet Count. Since the worst case
detection rate with randomization is a commendable 76%,
we conclude that randomization does not significantly affect
the detection rate of the MLP Classifier.
5. Conclusion
RCC Detector effectively detects bot command and control
traffic through a traffic analysis of an end-point host. Bot
detection within a minimum timeslot is performed by an
MLP Classifier that relies on traffic models of normal HTTP
and bot traffic; the detection rate is 99.8% and False Positive
Rate is 0.48% on cross validation testing. The FPR on evalu-
ation with DARPA dataset is 6%. For larger timeslots, the
property of temporal persistence of bot command and control
traffic is used to detect the presence of bots. The detection rate
and false positive rate are 100% and 0% respectively for the
Temporal Persistence Classifier. A dynamic white-list of desti-
nations is built using the MLP Classifier effectively reducing
false alerts and lowering the load on the system. It is seen that
effective bot detection takes place even when the C&C channel
is randomized.References
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